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It is known that measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) provides
ultimate security from all types of side-channel attack against detectors at the expense of low key
generation rate. Here, we propose MDI-QKD using 3-dimensional quantum states and show that the
protocol improves the secret key rate under the analysis of mismatched-basis statistics. Specifically,
we analyze security of the 3d-MDI-QKD protocol with uncharacterized sources, meaning that the
original sources contain unwanted states instead of expected one. We simulate secret key rate of
the protocol and identify the regime where the key rate is higher than the protocol with the qubit
MDI-QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography is a matured application of
quantum informational theory which exploits quantum
mechanical principle. In its core, there is a process called
quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] generating secure
key between two distant parties, Alice and Bob, against
a possible eavesdropper called Eve. There were many re-
searches for proving security of QKD based on quantum
mechanical effects [3–7] and experiments for demonstrat-
ing QKD system [8–13].
It is notable that the early QKD protocols use two
dimensional quantum state, called qubit [14]. Due to
its extensible structure, it is expected that high dimen-
sional quantum state is able to carry more information
per single quanta compared with qubit. Till now, high
dimensional quantum systems on photon were studied
for quantum communication in a various context. There
were theoretical ideas to exploit high dimensional quan-
tum states in quantum information processing, for ex-
ample, nonlocality test [15, 16], entanglement measure-
ment [17] and quantum teleportation [18, 19]. Experi-
mentally, high dimensional quantum states are demon-
strated in various quantum systems, energy-time entan-
gled states [20, 21], position and momentum entangled
states [22, 23], multi path-entangled states [24], and or-
bital angular momentum(OAM) mode [25, 26]. High
dimensional quantum states are applied in QKD pro-
tocol as well. There were researches for proving secu-
rity of QKD using d-dimensional quantum system which
is generalized version of original QKD protocol [27–32].
These results show that QKD using high dimensional
quantum states has higher upper bound on the error
rate that ensures unconditional security of the channel.
QKD protocols using high dimensional quantum states
are demonstrated by using time-energy states [33–36],
spatial modes [37, 38], and OAM modes [39, 40], so far.
In the other side of QKD investigation, security of
practical QKD system has also been scrutinized in de-
tail. Many theoretical security proofs have been made
under the assumptions that all devices are trusted or
well characterized for perfect security. However, in a real
situation, it becomes necessary to inspect the case that
untrusted devices are used seriously because they may
be produced by eavesdropper or they just cannot be op-
erated as expected. On the other hand, attack models
which exploit imperfect devices, called side channel at-
tack, are proposed and demonstrated recently. They were
photon number splitting (PNS) attack [41], faked-state
attack [42], detector efficiency mismatch attack [43], de-
tector blinding attack [44], time-shift attack [45], and
laser damage attack [46]. From the study of hacking
QKD system, it is known that imperfection of devices
in the system brings serious security problems. There
are security patches for each of the attacks, for example
using decoy states for preventing PNS attack [47], but
we need to defend all attacks even including undiscov-
ered one for ensuring perfect security of QKD.
In order to extend the notion of ultimate security,
device-independent QKD (DI-QKD) protocol is proposed
in 2007 [48, 49]. In the DI-QKD study, they proposed a
secure QKD scheme that is independent of the device
imperfection while the security is guaranteed by non-
local correlation identified by Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt (CHSH) type inequality [50]. However, it has been
turned out that DI-QKD is not easy to be implemented
in practice because it requires high quality entanglement
source, low-loss against noisy channel and highly efficient
detectors. Compensating the practicality, measurement-
device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) protocol is pro-
posed in 2012 [51]. In MDI-QKD scheme, all types of
possible side channel attack exploiting imperfection of
detectors are overcome by separating detectors from Al-
ice and Bob. For the separation, potentially untrusted
third party, called Charlie, is introduced for their QKD.
Alice and Bob send their encoded photon to Charlie,
then Charlie performs a special type of composite mea-
surement on his incoming photon pair, called Bell state
measurement (BSM). After the BSM, Charlie announces
the measurement result to Alice and Bob through the
classical channel, then the two party establish the corre-
lation between their photon when their encoding bases
are same. From the fact that Charlie only act as a ref-
eree for the correlation between Alice and Bob, he cannot
ar
X
iv
:1
60
6.
07
88
2v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
25
 Ju
n 2
01
6
2access to the encoded message as like eavesdropper and
it guarantees the unbounded security between Alice and
Bob.
Thus, by using MDI-QKD, we can overcome the most
of side channel attacks when the major security issues
are attributed to the imperfections of detectors [52]. The
other advantage of MDI-QKD is that no entanglement is
needed like BB84 protocol. There were several experi-
ments to demonstrates MDI-QKD using different physi-
cal systems, e.g. with time-bin states [53] and polariza-
tion states [54]. Especially, the latter realized the long
distance MDI-QKD over 200km [55].
In the mean while, the practical MDI-QKD still suf-
fers from its low key rate compared with BB84 protocol
together with high quality requirement that the commu-
nication source should satisfy. MDI-QKD needs BSM
setup that has only 50% success probability using lin-
ear optical elements [56]. Such the success probability of
BSM is mainly responsible for a low key generation rate
of MDI-QKD.
In this work, we propose MDI-QKD protocol using 3-
dimensional quantum state (3d-MDI-QKD) which allows
the improvement of the secret key rate compared with
the original protocol using qubits. In the security anal-
ysis, we focus on asymptotic key rates. We analyze the
security of 3d-MDI-QKD under the assumption that the
states generated from communication sources are not ide-
ally prepared, which is called the uncharacterized sources
assumption. We use the mismatched-basis statistics in
security analysis for 3d-MDI-QKD with uncharacterized
sources as it is proposed for qubit MDI-QKD in [57].
Here, we show that there is the improvement of the se-
curity in 3d-MDI-QKD compared with qubit MDI-QKD
in theoretical model, even if the communication sources
are uncharacterized. We simulate the secret key rate of
3d-MDI-QKD with the change of the realistic experimen-
tal factors and identify the regime where 3d-MDI-QKD
is more secure than qubit MDI-QKD.
This article is organized as following. In section II,
we present the schematic description of 3d-MDI-QKD.
In section III, we analyze the security of 3d-MDI-QKD
with uncharacterized sources by using the analysis of the
mismatched-basis statistics. In section IV, we simulate
the secret key rate of 3d-MDI-QKD and compare it with
that of qubit MDI-QKD in the theoretical model and
in the realistic experiment model. Finally, we conclude
in section V. Details of calculation are given in the Ap-
pendix.
II. MDI-QKD USING 3-DIMENSIONAL
QUANTUM STATES
In this section, we present the schematic description
of 3d-MDI-QKD. As its extension of the original qubit
MDI-QKD protocol [51], we assume that Alice and Bob
use two measurements at each site. In the original proto-
col, they use two orthonormal states to encode classical
(a)Time basis
(b)Energy basis
FIG. 1. A schematic setup to generate 3-dimensional quan-
tum states of two bases[33]. In time basis (a), Alice and Bob
encode information in time states of photon. In this setup,
the time states are generated with three different delay lines
and switch. The time that photon injected into the output
port can be controlled with choice of delay line. |0〉, |1〉 and
|2〉 denote time states when photon passes through the short-
est, the middle, and the longest delay line respectively. In
energy basis (b), Alice and Bob prepare similar settings with
phase modulators on delay lines and 1× 3 coupler instead of
switch. From Eq. (1), in order to generate the states in the
energy basis, {eiα, eiβ} should be {1, 1}, {ω2, ω}, and {ω, ω2}
to generate |0¯〉, |1¯〉 and |2¯〉 respectively.
binary bits 0 and 1. In our protocol, Alice and Bob use
two measurements at each site whose bases for the mea-
surement outcomes are consisted of three orthonormal
states. We assume that the two different measurements
are prepared in mutually unbiased bases (MUBs). The
condition for two bases to be MUBs in 3-dimensional
Hilbert space is that | 〈i|j¯〉 |2 = 1/3 for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2},
where {|0〉 , |1〉 , |2〉} and {|0¯〉 , |1¯〉 , |2¯〉} are two orthonor-
mal bases.
The 3-dimensional quantum states can be realized
through the various photonic degree of freedom in prac-
tice [33, 37, 38, 40]. Fig. 1 shows schematic setup to
generate 3-dimensional quantum states using the differ-
ent path length of the optical fiber. QKD protocol using
the encoding system is originally proposed in [33]. In the
time basis (Fig. 1 (a)), Alice controls the time that pho-
ton is injected into the output port of the settings. This
task can be accomplished by using 1 × 3 optical switch
and the three different delay lines. The arrival time of
photon at output port can be controlled since the delay
lines have different path length. In Fig. 1 (a), |0〉, |1〉
and |2〉 denote the three time states when photon passes
through the shortest, the middle, and the longest delay
line respectively. The time intervals among these three
time states must be large enough compared with pulse
3duration of source. In that case, these three states can
be distinguished by using measurement of arrival time of
photon. In order to create states belonging to the en-
ergy basis, Alice uses the setup shown in Fig. 1 (b). The
length of each delay lines should be same with that of the
time basis. There are phase modulators and 1×3 coupler
instead of 1 × 3 switch. 1 × 3 coupler splits a beam of
light into three output ports with same probabilities. In
that case, the output state of this setup is described by
1√
3
(|0〉+ eiα |1〉+ eiβ |2〉) where α and β are phase fac-
tors that Alice can control. Using the operation, three
orthogonal states of the other MUB can be generated and
they are described as
|0¯〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉+ |1〉+ |2〉) (1)
|1¯〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉+ ω2 |1〉+ ω |2〉)
|2¯〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉+ ω |1〉+ ω2 |2〉) ,
where ω3 = 1, ω2 + ω + 1 = 0 [58], and |0¯〉, |1¯〉 and
|2¯〉 denote the orthonormal states in the energy basis.
Throughout this paper, we denote two MUBs for 3d-
MDI-QKD ordinary basis and bar basis. In the example,
the ordinary basis and the bar basis are corresponding to
the time basis and the energy basis respectively.
Before introducing 3d-MDI-QKD, it is necessary to
redefine the representation of Bell state measurement
(BSM) as to describe the maximally entangled states of
3-dimensional bipartite system. There are nine maxi-
mally entangled states in 3-dimensional bipartite system.
We define {|Φi〉} as a set of 3-dimensional maximally en-
tangled states where i ∈ {0, 1, ..., 8}, and each state is
described as
|Φ3k+l〉 = 1√
3
2∑
m=0
ωml |m+ k,m〉 (2)
where k, l ∈ {0, 1, 2}. We omit (mod 3) from all indices as
a matter of simplification. Then the 3-dimensional BSM
(3d-BSM) is defined as a set of projections {Bˆi|Bˆi =
|Φi〉 〈Φi|}.
From now on, we discuss the procedure of 3d-MDI-
QKD. Similarly like the original protocol [51], Alice
(Bob) firstly chooses an integer number, indexed i,
among 0, 1, 2, 0¯, 1¯, and 2¯ randomly. Then she (he) gener-
ates the corresponding state |i〉 and sends it to untrusted
third party called Charlie. With the states, Charlie per-
forms 3d-BSM on the incoming photons and announces
the result of measurement through the public channel.
After the measurement, Alice and Bob share the informa-
tion about the encoding basis through the public channel.
Subsequently, after the basis comparison, they discard
the trial if the original bases are different. The remaining
data becomes sifted key after post-process based on the
result of 3d-BSM. In order to synchronize the encoded
information, it is necessary to perform the appropriate
post-process. The method of post-process is described in
Table I.
To evaluate the usefulness of the protocol, it is nec-
essary to analyze security of 3d-MDI-QKD. The analy-
sis can be made through the detailed inspection of the
equivalent protocol using entanglement distillation pro-
cess (EDP) [3, 5, 6]. The idea is that if Alice and Bob
share the maximally entangled state, Eve can not gener-
ate correlation between her state and the state of Alice
and Bob [59]. The property of entanglement is called
monogamy of entanglement. In the sense, QKD is al-
ways secure when Alice and Bob share the maximally
entangled states. Therefore, in this case, we can analyze
security of 3d-MDI-QKD with the amount of maximally
entangled states between Alice and Bob generated from
EDP. The equivalent protocol that exploit the entangled
pair can be found as follows.
1. Alice and Bob prepare photon pair in a maximally
entangled state |Φ0〉. Labels of Alice’s photons are
denoted as A and C, and those of Bob’s photons
are B and D. In the situation, they start with the
pairs of entanglement as
|Φ0〉AC =
1√
3
(|0, 0〉AC + |1, 1〉AC + |2, 2〉AC) (3)
|Φ0〉BD =
1√
3
(|0, 0〉BD + |1, 1〉BD + |2, 2〉BD) .
2. Alice (Bob) sends photon C (D) to Charlie.
3. Charlie performs 3d-BSM onto the incoming pho-
tons, and announces his result of measurement to
Alice and Bob.
4. The photon A and B become one of maximally en-
tangled state after 3d-BSM [60] if there is no loss
and there is no Eve.
FIG. 2. A schematic diagram of MDI-QKD using 3-
dimensional quantum states (3d-MDI-QKD). BSM means
Bell-state measurement. In 3-dim MDI-QKD, BSM should
be able to discriminate 3-dimensional maximally entangled
states.
4XXXXXXXXXBasis
BSM result |Φ0〉 |Φ1〉 |Φ2〉 |Φ3〉 |Φ4〉 |Φ5〉 |Φ6〉 |Φ7〉 |Φ8〉
Ordinary basis - - -
l→
l + 1
l→
l + 1
l→
l + 1
l→
l + 2
l→
l + 2
l→
l + 2
Bar basis 1↔ 2 0↔ 2 0↔ 1 1↔ 2 0↔ 2 0↔ 1 1↔ 2 0↔ 2 0↔ 1
TABLE I. In 3d-MDI-QKD protocol, Alice and Bob communicate with each other in order to share the information about
the encoding basis. After that, they should do post-process based on result of 3d-BSM in order to generate sifted key. In the
Table, we represent the post-process method for the case that Alice preserves hers data, and Bob modifies his data. (mod 3)
is omitted from the indices and l ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
5. In order to obatin |Φ0〉AB , Bob does unitary oper-
ation on his photon based on the result of 3d-BSM.
6. Alice (Bob) chooses measurement basis and mea-
sures hers (his) photon A (B).
7. Alice and Bob compare their measurement bases
and accept the encoded number as a key only when
they have used the same measurement bases.
8. If Alice and Bob used bar bases, Bob do post-
process to synchronize information. (See Table I)
9. The remaining data is used as sifted key.
In step 5, Alice and Bob share the maximally entangled
state |Φ0〉AB if there is no error and no Eve. Then this en-
tanglement version of 3d-MDI-QKD becomes same with
3-dimensional case of d-dimensional entanglement based
protocol proposed in [29]. Security analysis of the d-
dimensional entanglement based protocol has been stud-
ied in the previous works, against individual attack [29]
(Eve monitors states separately) and against collective
attack [30, 31] (Eve monitors several states jointly). Ac-
cording to the results, the secret key rate of 3d-MDI-QKD
per sifted key against collective attack is evaluated as
r ≥ log2 3− 2Q− 2H(Q) (4)
where H(x) is Shannon entropy defined as H(x) =
−x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) and Q denotes state er-
ror rate in the ordinary basis. If the state that Alice
and Bob share at the end of protocol is not |Φi〉 where
i = 0, 1, 2 then the trial has the state error in the or-
dinary basis. Then the state error rate in the ordinary
basis is described by
Q =
∑
i 6=j
〈i, j| ρˆ |i, j〉 , (5)
where ρˆ is density operator of Alice and Bob, and i, j ∈
{0, 1, 2}. In the ideal case without eavesdropper, the
state is remained to be ρˆ = |Φ0〉 〈Φ0|, so thus the error
rate becomes trivial since Q = 0.
III. 3d-MDI-QKD WITH UNCHARACTERIZED
SOURCES
MDI-QKD has an advantage that prevents all type
of side channel attack against detectors. It also guar-
antees the security even if detectors are fabricated or
controlled by Eve. In order to ensure the perfect se-
curity of MDI-QKD, there must be the assumption that
sources used in QKD are ideally prepared without error.
The states generated from the sources are well charac-
terized in the assumption. For example, sources should
generate one of the states among {|H〉 , |V 〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} in
the original MDI-QKD to guarantee the perfect security.
Here |H〉 is a single photon state with horizontal polar-
ization, |V 〉 is a photon with vertical polarization, and
|±〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 ± |V 〉). However, in real QKD setup,
communication sources can have misalignment in their
encoding system and the states generated from the com-
munication sources can be prepared differently from the
wanted state.
Through the analysis of mismatched-basis statistics
(MBS), it is proven that QKD with uncharacterized
sources can also be secure against possible channel eaves-
dropping [57]. In the original QKD protocol, the data
(a)Ideal case
HHHHBSM
x,y
0,0 0,1 0,2 1,0 1,1 1,2 2,0 2,1 2,2
p(x, y) 1/3 0 0 0 1/3 0 0 0 1/3
HHHHBSM
x,y
0,0¯ 0,1¯ 0,2¯ 1,0¯ 1,1¯ 1,2¯ 2,0¯ 2,1¯ 2,2¯
p(x, y) 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9
(b)Misalignment case
HHHHBSM
x,y
0, β¯0 1, β¯0 2, β¯0
p(x, y) (cos2 µ sin2 ν)/3 (sin2 µ sin2 ν)/3 (cos2 ν)/3
TABLE II. The success probabilities of 3d-BSM p(x, y) when
Alice and Bob send |x〉 and |y〉 to Charlie. We assume that 3d-
BSM is able to discriminate only |Φ0〉 and there is no loss and
no Eve. The success probabilities of 3d-BSM are calculated
from Tr[ρˆAB |Φ0〉 〈Φ0|]. (a) In ideal case, Alice and Bob send
the state in the ordinary basis or the bar basis. Since these
two bases are MUBs, the success probabilities of mismatched-
basis cases are same with 1/9. (b) In misalignment case, we
assume that Bob’s encoder has misalignment while Alice’s
is perfect. Bob’s source generates |β¯0〉 instead of |0¯〉, where
|β¯0〉 = cosµ sin ν |0〉 + sinµ sin ν |1〉 + cos ν |2〉 for arbitrary
angle µ and ν. The success probabilities of mismatched-basis
cases are modified from 1/9.
5that is obtained from the mismatched-basis are discarded
because Alice and Bob cannot extract any information
from it. However, in [57], they argue that the misalign-
ment of communication sources influence to the MBS
such that Alice and Bob can still extract secret key par-
tially with the analysis of MBS even if the sources are
uncharacterized.
Table II shows that the effect of misalignment in the
prepared states modifies the MBS in 3d-MDI-QKD. At
first, we consider the security for the case that 3d-BSM
produces one of the maximally entangled state, e.g. |Φ0〉.
In general, the number of possible entangled states that is
generated from BSM affects to the sifted key rate. Due to
the straightforward relationship, the security proof under
the shared single Bell state can be easily generalized to
the ideal BSM setup which is able to distinguish all of
the nine maximally entangled states.
In the Table, p(x, y) denotes success probability of
3d-BSM under the assumption of discriminating sin-
gle Bell state after Alice and Bob send the states |x〉
and |y〉 to Charlie respectively. Table II (a) shows the
probabilities when the communication sources for the
sender’s states are prepared perfectly. In Table II (b),
we assume that Bob’s source has misalignment while
Alice’s is perfect. Bob’s source generates |β¯0〉 instead
of |0¯〉. The misaligned state |β¯〉 is defined as |β¯0〉 =
cosµ sin ν |0〉+sinµ sin ν |1〉+cos ν |2〉 where µ and ν are
arbitrary angles. It can be seen that all the probabilities
of mismatched-basis case are 1/9 as in Table II (a). In
comparison, the distribution of the success probabilities
are changed when the basis is misaligned as shown in
Table II (b). The change allows Alice and Bob to iden-
tify the accuracy of communication sources through the
analysis of the MBS.
Before we analyze the security, we defined the explicit
form of generated states from uncharacterized sources in
detail. The states in the ordinary basis are |α0〉, |α1〉, and
|α2〉 for Alice, |β0〉, |β1〉, and |β2〉 for Bob. Subsequently,
the states in the bar basis are |α¯0〉, |α¯1〉, and |α¯2〉 for
Alice and |β¯0〉, |β¯1〉, and |β¯2〉 for Bob. The relations
between two bases are described as
|α¯k〉 =
2∑
j=0
Akje
iθkj |αj〉 (6)
|β¯k〉 =
2∑
j=0
Bkje
iϕkj |βj〉 ,
where A, B are non-negative real numbers and θ, ϕ are
arbitrary phases. Since Alice and Bob cannot specify
the details of generated states, we consider all the pos-
sible values of A, B, θ and ϕ for our security analysis.
The 3-dimensional maximally entangled states are rede-
fined to have arbitrary phases in the generated states.
3-dimensional maximally entangled states with the un-
determined phase factors are defined as
|Φ˜3k+l〉 = 1√
3
2∑
m=0
ωmlei(δm+k+ξk) |m+ k,m〉 , (7)
where δ and ξ are phase factors stemmed from experi-
mental setting, and it can be set δ0 = ξ0 = 0.
The secret key rate obtained in Eq. (4) is to be modified
for the case of uncharacterized communication source. In
the ordinary basis, there are two different types of error
Qs and Qp. Qs is the state error rate explained in section
II and Qp is phase error rate which indicates the state
error due to the phase factor. If Alice and Bob share the
maximally entangled state with additional phase factor
ω, for example |Φ1〉, then, Alice and Bob identify that
there is phase error as it differ from |Φ0〉 up to the phase
factor in the state. The phase error is comparable with
the state error that exists in the bar basis.
Eq. (4) is obtained under the scenario of symmetric
attack which is Eve’s optimal attack against ideal QKD
scheme. The symmetric attack is the strategy to ex-
tract the information from the two MUB measurements
at both sides equally well [27, 29, 31]. Since this attack
disturbs the measurement statistics equally for the two
different measurement bases, the equivalence of two error
rate Qs = Qp can be observed. At the same time, these
two errors should be discriminated to analyze the secu-
rity for QKD with uncharacterized sources. If we split
the effect of these two error rates, the secret key rate
becomes
r ≥ log2 3− (Qs +Qp)−H(Qs)−H(Qp). (8)
So if Alice and Bob calculate Qs and Qp, they can eval-
uate the secret key rate of 3d-MDI-QKD with uncharac-
terized sources.
We analyze the security with uncharacterized sources
from the number of generated maximally entangled states
using EDP. In the equivalent protocol with uncharacter-
ized sources, Alice and Bob choose measurement basis
before generating photon pair. According to their basis
choices, they generate the different photon pairs. Alice
(Bob) generates |ψ〉AC (|φ〉BD) if she (he) chooses ordi-
nary basis, and |ψ¯〉AC (|φ¯〉BD) if not. These state are
described as
|ψ〉AC =
1√
3
(|0, α0〉AC + |1, α1〉AC + |2, α2〉AC) (9)
|ψ¯〉AC =
1√
3
(|0¯, α¯0〉AC + |1¯, α¯2〉AC + |2¯, α¯1〉AC)
|φ〉BD =
1√
3
(|0, β0〉BD + |1, β1〉BD + |2, β2〉BD)
|φ¯〉BD =
1√
3
(|0¯, β¯0〉BD + |1¯, β¯2〉BD + |2¯, β¯1〉BD) .
Using the entangled states, Alice and Bob proceed 3d-
MDI-QKD protocol. After several repetition of the pro-
cedure, Alice and Bob get statistics of success probabili-
ties of 3d-BSM as it is described in Table II. The statistics
can be used for the security analysis of our protocol.
6For the security analysis, we consider the state after
the Eve’s general attack that can be described as
UˆE |αx〉C |βy〉D |e〉Ea |1〉Z (10)
=
√
(1− p(x, y)) |Ξxy〉E |0〉Z +
√
p(x, y) |Γxy〉E |1〉Z
where UˆE is Eve’s unitary operation. |e〉Ea is Eve’s an-
cillary system and Z denotes the state for the Charlie’s
message. |0〉Z indicates when the BSM fail and |1〉Z does
BSM succeed. p(x, y) is success probability of 3d-BSM
when Alice sends |αx〉 and Bob sends |βy〉 to Charlie.
|Ξxy〉E is Eve’s final state after eavesdropping when BSM
fail, while |Γxy〉E is Eve’s final state after eavesdropping
when BSM succeed. Eve’s final state can be expressed
as |Γxy〉E =
∑
n γxy(n) |n〉E where {|n〉} is orthonormal
basis of Eve’s state. In this expression, γxy(n) is com-
plex number which is obtained from γxy(n) = 〈n|Γxy〉.
γxy(n) satisfies
∑
n |γxy(n)|2 = 1. In these expressions,
we meant x, y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 0¯, 1¯, 2¯}. If we post-select only
the case |1〉Z when 3d-BSM succeed, the state of Alice,
Bob, and Eve in the ordinary basis is described as
ρˆABE = C × P
{ ∑
x,y=0
√
p(x, y) |x, y,Γxy〉ABE
}
(11)
where we use the notation for projector as P{|x〉} =
|x〉 〈x| and C is for the normalization constant. The den-
sity operator of Alice and Bob is obtained when Eve’s
system is traced out.
ρˆAB = TrE [ρˆABE ]
=
∑
n P
{∑2
x,y=0
√
p(x, y)γxy(n) |x, y〉AB
}
∑2
x,y=0 p(x, y)
. (12)
The security proof under the eavesdropping scenario is
achieved if Alice and Bob can get Qs and Qp. If they get
these error rates, they can analyze security of their QKD
system from Eq. (8). The state error rate Qs is easily
obtained from Eq. (12) and Eq. (5). It becomes
Qs =
p(0, 1) + p(0, 2) + p(1, 0) + p(1, 2) + p(2, 0) + p(2, 1)∑2
x,y=0 p(x, y)
.
(13)
From Eq. (13), Qs is calculated from success probabilities
of 3d-BSM. The phase error rate Qp is obtained by
Qp = 〈Φ˜1| ρˆ |Φ˜1〉+ 〈Φ˜2| ρˆ |Φ˜2〉+ 〈Φ˜4| ρˆ |Φ˜4〉
+ 〈Φ˜5| ρˆ |Φ˜5〉+ 〈Φ˜7| ρˆ |Φ˜7〉+ 〈Φ˜8| ρˆ |Φ˜8〉 .
As the last 4 terms are included in the state error rate,
the equation is simplified by the inequality,
Qp ≤〈Φ˜1| ρˆ |Φ˜1〉+ 〈Φ˜2| ρˆ |Φ˜2〉+Qs. (14)
〈Φ˜1| ρˆ |Φ˜1〉 and 〈Φ˜2| ρˆ |Φ˜2〉 include phase factors δ and ξ
which are defined in Eq. (7). In the circumstance, Alice
and Bob do not know the details of the phase factors since
the communication sources are uncharacterized. For the
true upper bound, one should consider the largest values
of 〈Φ˜1| ρˆ |Φ˜1〉 and 〈Φ˜2| ρˆ |Φ˜2〉. With the maximum, the
new upper bound of phase error rate can be found as
Qp ≤2
3
∑
n
∣∣∣∑2k=0√p(k, k)eiζkγkk(n)∣∣∣2∑2
x,y=0 p(x, y)
+Qs (15)
where ζ is the phase which makes the first term maxi-
mum. There are γ and ζ factors comes from Eve’s states.
Alice and Bob can not determine these factors. What Al-
ice and Bob want to get is the upper bound of phase error
rate which can be calculated from the success probabili-
ties of 3d-BSM only. We formulate the new upper bound
of phase error rate as
Qp ≤ ε+Qs, (16)
where ε is the factor calculated from the success proba-
bilities that is obtained from Eq. (6) and Eq. (10). It is
defined as
ε = max
A,B
[f01(A,B), f20(A,B)] , (17)
where max means finding maximum value for the coeffi-
cients A, B defined in Eq. (6). Details of the calculation
is described in Appendix. The function f is defined as
fxy(A,B) =
{
1−Qs if AxmBym = 0, ∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2}
min[Sxy(0), Sxy(1), Sxy(2)] otherwise.
(18)
7Sxy(m) is the upper bound function of the first term in Eq. (15) defined as
Sxy(m) =
2
3A2xmB
2
ym
∑2
i,j=0 p(i, j)

√√√√√√p(x¯, y¯) +∑
i 6=j
AxiByj
√
p(i, j)
2 + 2 2∏
k=1
Dxym(k) +
2∑
k=1
Dxym(k)

2
, (19)
where Dxym(k) denotes the expression
Dxym(k) = |AxmBym −Ax(m+k)By(m+k)|
√
p(m+ k,m+ k).
The function f is formed to find the smallest value of
Sxy(m) for m in order to obtain the tight upper bound
of the first term of Eq. (15). Sxy(m) exists only when
AxmBym 6= 0, because of the factor 1/AxmBym. If
AxmBym = 0 for all m ∈ {0, 1, 2}, no upper bound func-
tion Sxy(m) can be determined. In this case, Alice and
Bob conclude that the states generated from the unchar-
acterized sources are not suitable for QKD. The function
f has the form that the phase error rate becomes one in
the case.
ε is defined to identify the relations between |α¯0〉 and
|β¯1〉 as well as |α¯2〉 and |β¯0〉 in Eq. (17). The success
probabilities of 3d-BSM for these states are p(0¯, 1¯) = 0
and p(2¯, 0¯) = 0 in the ideal 3d-MDI-QKD. If communica-
tion sources are ideal, ε is zero. Then the secret key rate
of d-MDI-QKD with uncharacterized sources in Eq. (8)
becomes same with the secret key rate of ideal 3d-MDI-
QKD in Eq. (4). If the states generated from uncharac-
terized sources are not the ideal states, then the factor ε
becomes non-zero. In the case, the maximization of ε is
required in order to obtain the optimized secret key rate.
In order to find the maximum value of the factor ε,
Alice and Bob need to consider the constraints about
the coefficients A and B. The constraints are obtained
from MBS under the Eve’s attack, modeled in Eq. (10).
In the case that Alice and Bob send the single photon
states |α¯x〉 and |βy〉 to Charlie respectively, the success
probability of 3d-BSM can be obtained as
p(x¯, y) = |Z 〈1|E 〈Γx¯y| UˆE |α¯x〉A |βy〉B |2
and if we substitute |α¯x〉 in Eq. (6), we have
p(x¯, y) = |Z 〈1|E 〈Γx¯y| UˆE
[
2∑
i=0
Axie
θxi |αi〉A
]
|βy〉B |2.
(20)
Since Alice and Bob cannot determine the parameters
in the Eve’s side, |Γxy〉E and θ, they need to consider
the largest and the smallest values of undetermined fac-
tors for the constraints. Then, the constraints for Alice’s
coefficient can be obtained from Eq. (20),
−2
2∑
l=0
[
AjlAj(l+1)
√
p(l, i)p(l + 1, i)
]
≤ p(j¯, i)−
2∑
l=0
A2jlp(l, i) ≤ (21)
2
2∑
l=0
[
AjlAj(l+1)
√
p(l, i)p(l + 1, i)
]
where i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and j ∈ {0, 2}. Similarly, the con-
straints for Bob’s coefficient can be obtained from the
success probability of 3d-BSM when Alice and Bob send
|αx〉 and |β¯y〉 to Charlie respectively. The constraints for
Bob’s states are
−2
2∑
l=0
[
BklBk(l+1)
√
p(i, l)p(i, l + 1)
]
≤ p(i, k¯)−
2∑
l=0
B2klp(i, l) ≤ (22)
2
2∑
l=0
[
BklBk(l+1)
√
p(i, l)p(i, l + 1)
]
where i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and k ∈ {1, 0}. Now, Alice and Bob
have six constraints at each side. Using the constraints,
Alice and Bob are able to calculate the upper bound of
phase error rate with Eq. (16). Finally the secret key rate
of 3d-MDI-QKD with uncharacterized source can also be
obtained from the success probabilities of 3d-BSM.
IV. SIMULATION
In this section, we present the results for the secret
key rate simulation of 3d-MDI-QKD and 3d-MDI-QKD
with uncharacterized sources. In the simulation, we con-
sider the communication scenario that is realized by sin-
gle photon source only. First of all, we discuss the ideal
3d-MDI-QKD with uncharacterized sources. Since there
is no Eve and the devices are perfectly implemented,
the statistics of success probabilities in 3d-BSM becomes
same as it is shown in Table II (a). The state error rate
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FIG. 3. (a) The secret key rate per sifted key r of original MDI-QKD (black, dashed line) and 3d-MDI-QKD (red line). (b)
Secret key rate R per total signal of original qubit MDI-QKD (black, dashed line) and 3d-MDI-QKD (red line). We assumed
3d-BSM is able to discriminate three maximally entangled states among nine, and qubit BSM can discriminate two Bell states
among four. (c) The difference between the secret key rate R of original MDI-QKD and 3d-MDI-QKD. Both secret key rates
are obtained under the assumption of uncharacterized sources. ε is the factor which is defined in Eq. (16). Blue, dashed line
shows difference between the secret key rates when the state error rate is fixed as Qs = 0.01, red line shows the difference when
Qs = 0.05.
(a) (b) (c)
FIG. 4. The secret key rate of MDI-QKD vs. total transmission loss of optical channel. The dark count rate of single photon
detector is assumed as 10−5 per pulse. We assume there is no Eve. (a) The secret key rate r per sifted key of 3d-MDI-QKD
(blue, dashed line) and 3d-MDI-QKD with uncharacterized sources (red line). (b) The secret key rate r per sifted key of
original MDI-QKD (black, dashed line) and 3d-MDI-QKD (red line). Both secret key rates are obtained under the assumption
of uncharacterized sources. The intersection point of the secret key rates appears at the transmission loss 20dB approximately.
(c) The secret key rate R per total signal of original MDI-QKD (black, dashed line) and 3d-MDI-QKD (red line) under the
assumption of uncharacterized sources. We assume that qubit BSM discriminates two Bell states among four and 3d-BSM does
three maximally entangled states among nine. The intersection point appears at transmission loss 10.5dB approximately.
and the phase error rate are both zero within the con-
straints in Eq. (21) and in Eq. (22). Therefore, in the
ideal case, the secret key rate of 3d-MDI-QKD is identi-
cal to that of the protocol with uncharacterized sources.
Now, we compare the secret key rate r of original qubit
MDI-QKD [51] and 3d-MDI-QKD. In our simulation, r
denotes the secret key rate per sifted key. The secret
key rate per sifted key of original qubit MDI-QKD is
r2 = 1 − 2H(Qb), where Qb is quantum bit error rate
(QBER). The secret key rate per sifted key of 3d-MDI-
QKD is given in Eq. (4). Fig. 3 (a) shows these two
secret key rates. Red line denotes the secret key rate
of 3d-MDI-QKD and black dashed line denotes that of
original MDI-QKD. As it is seen already [27, 29–31], the
secret key rate of 3d-MDI-QKD is higher than that of
original MDI-QKD at the same error rate.
The original MDI-QKD has lower secret key rate than
BB84 since it has lower sifted key rate. We consider the
sifted key rate in the simulation and show that 3d-MDI-
QKD has higher secret key rate than original one even in
the realistic experiments. Fig. 3 (b) shows the secret key
rate R of original MDI-QKD and 3d-MDI-QKD per total
signal. R denotes the secret key rate per total signal. The
total signal includes the trials that Alice and Bob can not
generate the maximally entangled state and mismatched
bases are used in the measurements.
The secret key rate R can be obtained from R =
r×(sifted key rate). The sifted key rate is defined as
(sifted key rate)=(the probability Alice and Bob choose
same basis)×(the success probability of BSM). Since the
original MDI-QKD and 3d-MDI-QKD use two MUBs,
the first probability is same with 1/2. The success prob-
ability of BSM is 1/2 since qubit BSM setup can dis-
criminate two Bell states among four Bell states [56].
There is no proposed 3d-BSM setup with passive linear
optical elements yet. In the simulation, we assume that
93d-BSM discriminate three maximally entangled states
among nine. In that case, the success probability of 3d-
BSM is 1/3. The secret key rate of original MDI-QKD
R2 is obtained from R2 =
1
4r2 and that of 3d-MDI-QKD
is R3 =
1
6r3. In the Fig. 3 (b), the red line denotes R3
and the black, dashed line shows R2. Since the success
probability of 3d-BSM is lower than that of qubit BSM,
the difference between two key rates is decreased, but
still 3d-MDI-QKD always has higher key rate.
Fig. 3 (c) shows the difference between the two key
rates ∆R = R3−R2 against ε which is defined in Eq. (16).
The factor ε is related with suitability of sources for
QKD. The red line and the blue, dashed line denote the
case Qs = 0.01 and Qs = 0.05 respectively. ∆R becomes
large when ε goes large regardless the state error rate.
Here, we simulate the secret key rate with the change
of realistic experimental factors. We consider the two
experimental factors, transmission efficiency of photonic
channels (η) and dark count rate of single photon de-
tectors (SPDs) d. There is transmission loss when the
photon passes through optical fiber or atmosphere, so
the transmission efficiency is approximately proportional
to the distance which QKD can be achieved. For SPD,
since the SPD is very sensitive device, it is possible to
be clicked even if no photon enters in SPD. This click
produce the dark count in the device. The dark count
rate is assumed as 10−5 per pulse in the our simulation.
Qubit BSM consists of four SPDs [56] in order to dis-
criminate polarization Bell states of the photons. Con-
trarily, as it is already mentioned, there is no realistic 3d-
BSM setup with passive linear optical elements proposed
yet. In our simulation, we assume that 3d-BSM consists
of six SPDs to measure two photons and each photon is
encoded in three orthonormal states. If there is no Eve,
the success probabilities of 3d-BSM is described as
p(i, i) = (23)
η2(1− d)4
3
+ 2η(1− η)d(1− d)4 + 3(1− η)2d2(1− d)4
p(i, j) = 2η(1− η)d(1− d)4 + 3(1− η)2d2(1− d)4 (24)
where i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, i 6= j and 3d-BSM discriminates one
of the maximally entangled state |Φ0〉 only. In that case,
all the probabilities of mismatched basis cases are same,
so that p(i, j¯) = p(j, i¯) = p(¯i, j) where i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. In
Eq. (23), the first term describes the situation that two
photons trigger off SPDs with 1/3 success probability.
The second term denotes the situation that one photon
arrive at SPD and the other photon is lost. In that case,
the second SPD is clicked due to the dark count of the
detector. The final term denotes the situation that two
photons are lost but two SPDs are clicked because of dark
counts [57]. With these probabilities, the state error rate
and the phase error rate can be calculated and the secret
key rates are plotted in Fig. 4 with respect to (1− η).
Fig. 4 (a) shows the secret key rate r of 3d-MDI-QKD
(blue, dashed line) and 3d-MDI-QKD with uncharacter-
ized sources (red line) vs. transmission loss. ε is not zero
because of transmission loss in Eq. (24). Since non-zero
value of ε is considered as imperfection of communication
sources in the security analysis under the assumption of
uncharacterized source, 3d-MDI-QKD with uncharacter-
ized sources has lower the secret key rate than 3d-MDI-
QKD even if communication sources generate the exact
states.
The secret key rate r of original MDI-QKD (black,
dashed line) and 3d-MDI-QKD (red line) are shown in
Fig. 4 (b). Both secret key rates are calculated under
the assumption of uncharacterized sources [57]. 3d-MDI-
QKD has higher secret key rate than original MDI-QKD
only when transmission loss is low. This effect comes
from increased dark counts since 3d-BSM has more SPDs
than qubit BSM. The cross point appears at the trans-
mission loss 20dB approximately.
Fig. 4 (c) shows the secret key rate R of original MDI-
QKD (black, dashed line) and 3d-MDI-QKD (red line).
These secret key rates are calculated from the multipli-
cation between sifted key rate and the secret key rates
plotted r shown in Fig. 4 (b). Because of low success
probability of 3d-BSM, the difference between two key
rates is decreased. The cross point appears at the trans-
mission loss 10.5dB approximately.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated security of 3d-MDI-QKD
and that of 3d-MDI-QKD with uncharacterized sources.
We assumed that 3d-BSM is able to discriminate three
maximally entangled states among nine in the simula-
tion. We showed that 3d-MDI-QKD has higher secret
key rate than original qubit MDI-QKD at the same error
rate even if we consider sifted key rate. The endurance
of 3d-MDI-QKD against low accuracy of the communica-
tion sources is better than that of original MDI-QKD as
shown in Fig. 3 (c). In the simulation with the realistic
experimental parameters, 3d-MDI-QKD has higher key
rates only when the transmission loss is low. Since the
transmission loss proportional to length of optical fiber,
this shows that 3d-MDI-QKD has higher secret key rate
only when it is implemented for the short distance com-
munication.
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Appendix A: Calculation of ε in 3d-MDI-QKD with
uncharacterized sources
In appendix, we show the details of calculation to ob-
tain Eq. (19). The upper bound of phase error rate is
Qp ≤ 〈Φ˜1| ρˆ |Φ˜1〉+ 〈Φ˜2| ρˆ |Φ˜2〉+Qs (A.1)
from Eq. (14). The first two terms can be calculated from
density operator of Alice and Bob
〈Φ˜1| ρˆ |Φ˜1〉 = 1
3
∑
n |
∑2
k=0
√
p(k, k)ωkei(δk+ξk)γkk(n)|2∑2
x,y=0 p(x, y)
,
〈Φ˜2| ρˆ |Φ˜2〉 = 1
3
∑
n |
∑2
k=0
√
p(k, k)ω2kei(δk+ξk)γkk(n)|2∑2
x,y=0 p(x, y)
,
where δ0 = ξ0 = 0. Since Alice and Bob can not deter-
mine the exact phases δ and ξ, they should consider the
maximum values of these two equation in order to cover
all the possible phase factors. Then the upper bound of
the phase error rate becomes
Qp ≤ 2
3
∑
n |
∑2
k=0
√
p(k, k)eiζkγkk(n)|2∑2
x,y=0 p(x, y)
+Qs.
where ζ is the phase which makes maximum the first
term. There are γ and ζ factors which Alice and Bob
can not determine. Alice and Bob need the upper bound
of the phase error rate which is described with the success
probabilities of 3d-BSM only. The phase error rate in the
ordinary basis must be related with probabilities in bar
basis. Therefore, we consider the caset that Alice and
Bob sends |α¯x〉 and |β¯y〉 to Charlie respectively. After
post-selection of successful 3d-BSM case(|1〉Z), Eq. (10)
becomes
UˆE |α¯x〉C |β¯y〉 |e〉Ea =
√
p(x¯, y¯) |Γx¯y¯〉E
=
√
p(x¯, y¯)
∑
n
γx¯y¯(n) |n〉E . (A.2)
The left-hand-side of Eq. (A.2) is described in the ordinary basis from the relations between two bases(Eq. (6)),
UˆE |α¯x〉C |β¯y〉D |e〉Ea = UˆE
2∑
i,j=0
AxiByje
i(θxi+ϕyj) |αi〉C |βj〉D |e〉Ea
=
2∑
i,j=0
AxiByj
√
p(i, j)ei(θxi+ϕyj) |Γij〉E
=
∑
n
2∑
i,j=0
AxiByj
√
p(i, j)ei(θxi+ϕyj)γij(n) |n〉E .
With this equation, Eq. (A.2) becomes∑
n
2∑
i,j=0
AxiByj
√
p(i, j)ei(θxi+ϕyj)γij(n) |n〉E =
√
p(x¯, y¯)
∑
n
γx¯y¯(n) |n〉E . (A.3)
We rearrange the equation to obtain the upper bound of the phase error rate,∑
n
2∑
i=0
AxiByi
√
p(i, i)ei(θxi+ϕyi)γii(n) |n〉E
=
∑
n
√p(x¯, y¯)γx¯y¯(n)− 2∑
i 6=j
AxiByj
√
p(i, j)ei(θxi+ϕyj)γij(n)
 |n〉E . (A.4)
Doing absolute square on both sides,
∑
n
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
i=0
AxiByi
√
p(i, i)ei(θxi+ϕyi)γii(n)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= p(x¯, y¯) +
∑
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
i 6=j
AxiByj
√
p(i, j)ei(θxi+ϕyj)γij(n)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(A.5)
−
∑
n
√
p(x¯, y¯)γ∗x¯y¯(n)
2∑
i6=j
AxiByj
√
p(i, j)ei(θxi+ϕyj)γij(n)
−
∑
n
√
p(x¯, y¯)γx¯y¯(n)
2∑
i6=j
AxiByj
√
p(i, j)e−i(θxi+ϕyj)γ∗ij(n),
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since
∑
n |γxy(n)|2 = 1. Considering the phase which makes right-hand-side maximum,
∑
n
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
i=0
AxiByi
√
p(i, i)ei(θxi+ϕyi)γii(n)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤
√p(x¯, y¯) + 2∑
i 6=j
AxiByj
√
p(i, j)
2 . (A.6)
The inequality is satisfied for all phase θ and ϕ, so
∑
n
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
i=0
AxiByi
√
p(i, i)eiζiγii(n)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤
√p(x¯, y¯) + 2∑
i 6=j
AxiByj
√
p(i, j)
2 (A.7)
is also satisfied, where ζ is the phase makes left-hand-side maximum. By using triangular inequality, the left-hand-side
of the inequality becomes
∑
n
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
i=0
AxiByi
√
p(i, i)eiζiγii(n)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(A.8)
≥
∑
n
[
AxmBym
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
i=0
√
p(i, i)eiζiγii(n)
∣∣∣∣∣−
2∑
i=0
|AxmBym −AxiByi|
√
p(i, i)|eiζiγii(n)|
]2
=
∑
n
A2xmB2ym
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
i=0
√
p(i, i)eiζiγii(n)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
2∑
i=0
|AxmBym −AxiByi|2p(i, i)|eiζiγii(n)|2
− 2AxmBym
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
i=0
√
p(i, i)eiζiγii(n)
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
k=1
Dxym(k)|eiζm+kγ(m+k)(m+k)(n)|+ 2
2∏
k=1
Dxym(k)|eiζm+kγ(m+k)(m+k)|
]
where we omit (mod 3) in subscription, m ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and Dxym(k) is the expression defined as
Dxym(k) = |AxmBym −Ax(m+k)By(m+k)|
√
p(m+ k,m+ k).
With the help of Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, lower bound of right-hand-side of Eq. (A.8) is obtained.
∑
n
A2xmB2ym
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
i=0
√
p(i, i)eiζiγii(n)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
2∑
i=0
|AxmBym −AxiByi|2p(i, i)|eiζiγii(n)|2 (A.9)
− 2AxmBym
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
i=0
√
p(i, i)eiζiγii(n)
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
k=1
Zxym(k)|eiζm+kγ(m+k)(m+k)(n)|+ 2
2∏
k=1
Dxym(k)|eiζm+kγ(m+k)(m+k)|
]
≥
∑
n
A2xmB
2
ym
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
i=0
√
p(i, i)eiζiγii(n)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
2∑
i=0
|AxmBym −AxiByi|2p(i, i)
∑
n
|eiζiγii(n)|2
− 2AxmBym
2∑
k=1
Dxym(k)
√√√√∑
n
|
2∑
i=0
√
p(i, i)eiζiγii(n)|2
∑
n′
|eiζm+kγ(m+k)(m+k)(n′)|2
=
AxmBym
√√√√∑
n
|
2∑
i=0
√
p(i, i)eiζiγii(n)|2 −
2∑
k=1
Dxym(k)
2 − 2 2∏
k=1
Dxym(k)
because
∑
n=0 |γxy(n)|2 = 1. From Eq. (A.7), Eq. (A.8) and Eq. (A.9), we obtain the inequality√p(x¯, y¯) + 2∑
i 6=j
AxiByj
√
p(i, j)
2 ≥
AxmBym
√√√√∑
n
|
2∑
i=0
√
p(i, i)eiζiγii(n)|2 −
2∑
k=1
Dxym(k)
2 − 2 2∏
k=1
Dxym(k)
(A.10)
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Rearranging Eq. (A.10) about
∑
n |
∑2
i=0
√
p(i, i)eiζiγii(n)|2, the inequality becomes
∑
n
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i=0
√
p(i, i)eiζiγii(n)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ 1
A2xmB
2
ym

√√√√√√p(x¯, y¯) +∑
i6=j
AxiByi
√
p(i, j)
2 + 2 2∏
k=1
Dxym(k) +
2∑
k=1
Dxym(k)

2
(A.11)
only when AxmBym 6= 0. In order to simplify the description, the function S is defined as
Sxy(m) =
2
3A2xmB
2
ym
∑2
i,j=0 p(i, j)

√√√√√√p(x¯, y¯) +∑
i 6=j
AxiByj
√
p(i, j)
2 + 2 2∏
k=1
Dxym(k) +
2∑
k=1
Dxym(k)

2
.
(A.12)
The upper bound function f and the factor ε is defined with the function S as explained in main text.
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